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Topics on maritime cyber security have undoubtedly been 
attracting great public attention in recent days. The reasons are 
rapidly evolving computing technologies and digitalization in 
maritime sector. A successful cyber-attack may have catastrophic 
consequences and a harmful impact on people, properties 
or marine environment. In addition to numerous factors that 
pave the way for a successful cyber-attack on ships, human 
errors are also in the limelight as they are notorious sources of 
cyber-attacks today. In this research paper, the authors examine 
Montenegrin seafarers’ level of familiarisation with current cyber-
security risks by conducting a structured survey questionnaire. 
After thoroughly analysing the collected answers, the authors 
realise that the respondents have an insufficient level of cyber-
security knowledge and awareness. Lastly, using the quantitative 
risk assessment method, the authors propose the best practices 
for maritime cyber security in the form of implementation of 
mandatory training course. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
A successful cyber-attack may be an important issue from 
the safety, environmental, and commercial standpoints. Cyber 
security at sea is largely related to critical infrastructures and, 
therefore, there is an urgent need to do the revaluation of the 
current awareness and preparedness of crews to adequately 
respond to maritime cyber risks.
“Maritime cyber risk refers to a measure of the extent to which 
a technology asset is threatened by a potential circumstance or 
event, which may result in shipping-related operational, safety, 
or security failures as a consequence of information or systems 
being corrupted, lost or compromised” (International Maritime 
Organization, 2017a). As a matter of fact, modern vessels rely 
heavily on remote monitoring and automation that can provide 
porous holes to hackers and cybercriminals, resulting in a 
compromise of vessel’s key components such as ECDIS, VDR, 
RADAR/ARPA, GNSS, ballast/cargo/engine control systems, which 
are operated and controlled by the crew. Skills of a crew define 
how efficiently the systems will work (Yousefi and Seyedjavadin, 
2012).
In order to mitigate cyber-security risks and reduce the 
level of their human dependency, several leading maritime 
organizations such as e.g. IMO, BIMCO, International Chamber of 
Shipping developed a set of guidelines. Their purpose is to assist 
shipowners and vessel operators in reducing the chance of a 
successful cyber incident, and to recover from it. 
BIMCO Guidelines on Cyber Security On board Ships (BIMCO, 
2017), EU Regulation 2016/679 (The European parliament and 
the Council of the European Union, 2016), IMO MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3 
(International Maritime Organization, 2017a), ISO 27032:2012, 
which will be soon replaced by ISO/IEC WD 27032 (ISO, no date), This work is licensed under
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USCG Policy Letter No. 08-16 (USCG, 2016), TMSA Cyber security 
guidelines for vessels (TMSA, 2019), UK Department of Transport 
Code of Practice Cyber Security for Ships (Boyes and Isbell, 
2017), USCG Cyber Security Strategy (USCG, 2015) are the most 
important sources for raising cybersecurity awareness at sea. 
Various internationally required training courses, such 
as Security Awareness Training for all Seafarers or the Marine 
Environmental Awareness, have already been established. IMO 
“encourages Administrations to ensure that cyber risks are 
appropriately addressed in safety management systems no later 
than the first annual verification of the company's Document 
of Compliance after 1 January 2021” (International Maritime 
Organization, 2017b: 1) which is a great step forward towards 
achieving global shipping goals. 
This research paper sheds a light on why the cyber risks at 
sea are still not adequately treated from the seafarer-education 
point of view, even after some very significant events such as 
hacking of Maersk’s assets. 
In fact, the hacking of Maersk occurred back in June 2017. 
At that time, due to successful NotPetya malware attack, the 
giant company lost between USD 250-300 million, and was 
forced to reinstall more than 4,000 servers and 45,000 PCs (A.P. 
Moller - Maersk, 2017; Cimpanu, 2018). Up to date, this has been 
the most serious attack of its kind, once again confirming that 
shipping companies are not prepared to respond to cyber risks 
adequately.
The largest number of safety incidents at sea occur due to 
human error (Yousefi and Seyedjavadin, 2012). It is no different 
in cyber security either. Overall situational awareness of the 
navigator while performing his duties on the navigation bridge 
consists of spatial, task, and system awareness, including cyber 
security awareness as well (Hareide et al., 2018). Research (Svilicic, 
Rudan, et al., 2019) explores cyber-security threatening Integrated 
Navigational System, stating that cyber-security awareness of 
crew is satisfying. However, another study (Svilicic, Kamahara, et 
al., 2019: 10) states that “crew is not familiar with cybersecurity 
policies, procedures and agreements, and practice insufficient 
cyber hygiene”. More articles assess the IT infrastructure and on-
board policies related to cyber-security protection, but only few 
of them are aimed at defining seafarers’ level of awareness and 
knowledge of cyber threats (Bolat, Yüksel and Yüksel, 2016).
Is the awareness of Montenegrin seafarers of cyber-security 
high enough to make them a reliable part of the defensive shield 
to prevent malicious attacks on board vessel? To that end, this 
research paper carries out the analysis of seafarers’ awareness 
and their knowledge of basic cyber-security aspects, and further 
weights the findings on a risk scale. 
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides an 
overview of common cyber-security threats at sea and users’ 
best practices. Section 3 deals with current education process 
of seafarers in Montenegro. Section 4 explains the method of 
obtaining survey responses, which are assessed in Section 5. 
Section 6 elaborates the problem solutions. The findings are 
discussed in Section 7.
2. COMMON CYBER-SECURITY THREATS TO SHIPS AND 
USER BEST PRACTICES
There is a difference between general maritime security 
and maritime cyber security. While the topic of the former has 
been widely explored since the implementation of ISPS Code in 
2003, the latter requires further attention. 
Various studies have been done to clarify and explore cyber-
security risks and threats on vessels. The most important ones 
are: Witherby Publishing Group, BIMCO, and the International 
Chamber of Shipping (ICS), 2019.
a. Malware – a malicious piece of code that is utilised by 
cyber pests to carry out a cyber-attack. The example of malware 
incorporates viruses, worms, Trojan horses, ransomware, spyware, 
bots, etc. The malware can steal, delete, encrypt or damage 
sensitive data without knowledge of the victim. “Malware often 
infects ship’s computers through the crew’s use of memory 
sticks”. (Riviera, 2020);
b. Social engineering - technique that manipulates human 
psychology to get sensitive data. The victim makes mistakes 
that lead to data breaches. According to the Korean Register of 
Shipping, “social engineering means to secure access rights to 
systems, data, and buildings by exploiting human psychology 
instead of a technical hacking technique to steal into the system”. 
There are different types of social engineering such as:
a.  Phishing - combines social engineering and technical 
methods to trick victims into divulging sensitive 
information such as identity and financial-related data or 
anything else that attackers perceive to have value (Furnell, 
Millet and Papadaki, 2019). Successful phishing attack can 
create extreme harm, e.g. in case of steeling sensitive 
information about the ship or itinerary details;
b.  Spear phishing - yet another form of phishing. Clicking 
on the link may cause installation of malicious software, 
trackers, loss of credentials, personal data or valuable 
shipping details. Spear phishing is sophisticated and 
difficult to detect;
c.  The so-called e-mail spoofing, still a surprisingly easy 
technique used for distribution of forged electronic 
documents that attempt to mislead the recipient about 
the origin of the message (Hu, Peng and Wang, 2018). 
Following of e-mail instructions or requests may lead to 
the loss of sensitive information, e.g. ship’s schedule, data 
on nationality of the crew, etc.;
c. Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack is a kind of 
cooperative attack model where attackers use many machines to 
simultaneously launch DoS attacks causing the target’s resources 
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or network band-width to become exhausted or to collapse (Li 
et al., 2018). On board ship, it can lead to failure of navigational, 
engineering, and other system.
By conducting a literature research, two main types of best 
practices for reducing cyber-threat at sea are identified. The first 
is related to the network arrangement and implementation of 
various software and hardware solutions, while the second is 
focused on asset management and user best practices. For the 
purpose of this research, the authors have identified widely 
accepted cyber-security best practices whose level of success 
depends on user behaviour:
a. Use a strong password - Using a strong password can 
create the main barrier against cybercriminals. A weak password 
can be guessed within hours. Hackers compromise seafarers’ 
passwords using various techniques such as a Brute-force attack, 
dictionary attack, and phishing attack. This type of attack can 
have devastating consequences;
b. Stay vigilant against phishing emails – The seafarer should 
avoid clicking on any attachment or link from suspicious emails, 
especially when working on a ship’s system or a network;
c. Avoid using removable media - Removable media such as 
flash drive or smartphone memory card are vulnerable devices 
and can pose a serious challenge to ship’s systems or/and 
network. Therefore, a seafarer must avoid using flash drives. They 
should save essential ship-related documents into the cloud 
drive or a soft copy into a secure personal computer or a laptop;
d. Stay vigilant against SMS attacks - Seafarers often prefer 
using SIM cards that offer cheap rates and data plans. Today’s 
hackers better understand human psychology and know how to 
manipulate it. To this end, they send a phishing SMS with a link 
that involves the cheapest offers on calling and data plans. As 
soon as the seafarer opens the link, malware is installed on his/
her phone. To avoid this nightmare, the seafarer must disregard 
such SMS or avoid opening unknown links inside it;
e. Avoid using free Wi-Fi - Free offers and gifts often grab 
everyone’s attention, but they can prove detrimental to Seafarer’s 
digital property. Threat actors often cleverly provide free Wi-Fi at 
ports or its suburbs. The seafarer must not access a free public Wi-
Fi hotspot and must avoid putting sensitive credentials;
f. Patching - All the ship’s systems should be regularly patched 
and updated. A patch can fix a security vulnerability and bugs in 
the software application as well as improve its performance. For 
example, if an ECDIS is not stable upon installation of new charts, 
a new patch can resolve the issue.
3. CURRENT EDUCATION PROCESS RELATED TO CYBER 
SECURITY AT SEA
How does the current educational process in Montenegro 
look like and is it good enough to suit the needs of today’s 
market? 
The education of seafarers in Montenegro is organised in 
two levels. The first is secondary education, which lasts for 4 years. 
Upon completion of Maritime High School, a person can choose 
between two paths - joining a vessel and starting a professional 
career or enrolling one of the accredited Maritime Faculties in 
order to get a higher education degree. Enrolment to a university 
study programme is allowed to anyone who has completed 
secondary education, even if it is not through Maritime High 
School. Upon completion of 3-year studies, students get the 
Bachelor’s degree and are allowed to start their seafarer career.
In 2010, Maritime High School in Kotor started carrying 
out re-qualification courses for all those who had previously 
obtained a non-maritime high school diploma. Their purpose 
is to offer an alternative to people who are not interested in 
higher education and at the same time have no will to study the 
complete maritime-high-school programme for another 4 years. 
The re-qualification course plan has been done in accordance 
Figure 1.
Education road-map for becoming a seafarer in Montenegro.
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“The Standards of Training, Certification and Watch keeping 
(STCW) regulations developed by the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) lists down the competencies and skills the 
seafarer should possess”(Sharma et al., 2019: 4). According to 
legislation in the Republic of Montenegro (The government of 
Montenegro, 2013, 2017; Ministry of Transport and Maritime 
Affairs, 2015, 2018), anyone who wants to be a seafarer is required 
to continue the education process by attending and completing 
various courses and passing related examinations in front of 
the Harbour Master’s Commission. That is the case in all other 
countries that ratified the STCW convention.
Besides the previously mentioned IMO model courses 7.03 
and 7.04, education plans and programmes of Maritime Faculties 
are also in line with the IMO model courses 7.01 - Master and 
Chief Mate and 7.02 - Chief Engineer Officer and Second Engineer 
Officer. On analysing these model courses, it is clear that the IMO 
does not require a seafarer to have any knowledge either about 
IT/OT topics or about cyber security. However, the world leading 
classification societies DNVGL and Lloyd’s Register organise the 
E-learning Maritime Cyber Security Course (DNV GL, no date) and 
Cyber and Data Protection Awareness Training (Lloyd’s Register, no 
date) respectively.
Exploring the current curricula of the above-mentioned 
educational institutions in Montenegro, one finds that each of 
them is exploring specific IT fields, most notably the application 
of software programmes from MS Office – Word and Excel. The 
use of the Internet and modern maritime technologies such as 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is addressed to a lesser 
extent. The Faculty of Maritime Studies of Kotor goes a step 
further by providing students with an education in the basics 
of computer networks and network protocols. A deeper study 
of computer networks as well as their protection has not been 
addressed so far. 
The following sections present a survey done among 
active seafarers in order to scale their level of awareness of cyber 
security. 
4. SURVEY METHOD
Taking into consideration common cyber threats and best 
practices presented in Section 2 of this paper, the authors created 
a structured survey questionnaire. Its purpose is to find out the 
level of Montenegrin seafarers’ awareness and their potential 
ability to adequately respond to cyber threats.
The total number of active seafarers licensed in Montenegro 
is 3,000 (official data not published). The research population 
consists of 429 participants sailing in the rank of deck/engine 
officer or Master on ocean-going vessels operated by various 
worldwide reputable companies, including Mediterranean 
Shipping Company – MSC, Mitsui Ocean Line – MOL, Eastern 
Mediterranean Maritime, Dabinović, Reederei Nord, Crnogorska 
Plovidba, Bernhard Schulte Ship Management, CMA CGM, 
Subsea 7, and others. Even though all the previously mentioned 
companies employ multinational crews, the conducted survey 
was limited to seafarers of Montenegrin nationality whose names 
are undisclosed due to privacy. 
The survey questionnaire consists of a total of 18 questions 
which are presented in Table 3. They are structured in a 
comprehensive way to enable quantitative research as plausible 
and affordable method for gathering information from seafarers. 
The respondents were asked to choose only one answer for each 
question. 
5. RISK ASSESSMENT AND SURVEY RESULTS
To carry out risk assessment, it is necessary to define the 
key terms at the very beginning: risk, hazard, harm (impact), 
likelihood, severity, and risk assessment.
There are several definitions of risk. A commonly-used 
glossary (Committee on Foundations of Risk Analysis, 2015) offers 
7 definitions of risk while ISO (ISO, 2009) shortly defines it as the 
“effect of uncertainty on objectives”. “Information security risk 
comprises the impacts on an organization and its stakeholders 
that could occur due to the threats and vulnerabilities associated 
with the operation and use of information systems and the 
environments in which those systems operate” (Gantz and 
Philpott, 2013). 
“A hazard is a source of potential injury, harm or damage. 
It may come from many sources, e.g. situations, the environment 
or a human element.”(Maritime and Coastguard Agency, 2019, p. 
37)
Harm or impact can be defined as the degree of damage or 
harm caused to the organisation or an asset. 
The likelihood of occurrence is the probability that a 
cybercriminal will initiate a threat or the probability that a threat 
could successfully exploit the given vulnerability (ISO, 2009). 
Both likelihood and impact can be viewed in either objective 
or subjective terms. In an objective expression, likelihood and 
impact could be expressed in terms of numerical values. On the 
other hand, subjectively, both elements are termed qualitatively 
or utilizing a range of descriptions on a scale. 
with IMO model courses 7.03 - Officer in Charge of Navigational 
Watch and 7.04 - Officer in Charge of Engineering Watch, and are 
popular among elder population.
To better demonstrate the official educational path of 
seafarers in Montenegro, the following scheme has been created 
(Figure 1). Of course, seafarer education process does not end on 
finishing Maritime Faculty studies, Maritime High School or a re-
qualification course, or on joining a vessel for the first time.
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Table 1.
Weight (importance) of each question for final risk 
assessment,
Table 2.
Numerical values of answer choices.
Severity is the amount of damage that a hazard could 
create. For example, the severity of harm can be slight, moderate 
or extreme. 
Risk assessment is a systematic process of determining the 
number of hazards or threats that could occur in a given amount 
of time to your computer systems and networks (Prowse, 2017). 
“The purpose of risk assessment is primarily to support decision-
making, including decisions on risk-reducing measures in the 
context of a structured, systematic and documented process” 
(Vinnem and Røed, 2020, p. 78). There are two types of risk 
assessment – i.e. “Quantitative Risk Assessment” and “Qualitative 
Risk Assessment.”
Quantitative risk assessment is a systematic risk-analysis 
technique used to quantify the risks associated with the IT 
infrastructure of an organization. It helps in understanding the 
exposure to risk of the IT environment, employees (or seafarers), 
corporate assets and its reputation. As said before, this technique 
involves numerical values. Though Quantitative Risk Assessment 
is easier, cheaper, and quicker, it cannot give a total asset value 
for a potential monetary loss. For instance, using this approach 
we can assign the ranges from 1 to 50 or 1 to 100. If the number 
is high, the likelihood of occurrence is high. For example, the 
computer having no firewall or antivirus programme has a high 
probability of risk. 
“Risk analysis methods that use intensive quantitative 
measures are not suitable for today’s information security risk 
analysis” (Karabacak and Sogukpinar, 2005, p. 148). However, to 
measure cyber security awareness of Montenegrin seafarers, the 
authors implemented ISRAM (Karabacak and Sogukpinar, 2005) 
quantitative risk assessment method as the second most useful 
in comparison with SANS, OA, Mehari, COBRA and FAIR (Svensson, 
2017).
The risk model of ISRAM is based on the following formula:
Risk =  (                                 ) x (                                 )
∑m[T1 (∑iwi pi )]
m




i: the number of questions for the survey of probability of 
occurrence;
j: the number of questions for the survey of consequences 
of occurrence;
m: the number of participants who participated in the 
survey of probability of occurrence;
n: the number of participants who participated in the 
survey of consequences of occurrence;
wi ; wj: weight of the question i ; j;
pi ; pj: numerical value of the selected answer choice for 
question i / j;







T1: the risk table for the survey of probability of occurrence;
T2: the risk table for the survey of consequences of 
occurrence;
Risk: a single numeric value for representing the risk.
Note: All the survey participants answered all the questions 
from the questionnaire. Therefore, m is equal to n.
On completion of the questionnaire, but before conducting 
the survey, the authors “weighted” each question to scale their 
importance in assessing final risk. In other words, not all questions 
contribute equally to the conclusion of this research. Weight 
scale is shown in Table 1 for both probability and consequence 
of cyber-attack.




0 Answer has no effect on probability and/
or consequence of cyber accident.
1 Answer is slightly effective to probability 
and/or consequence of cyber accident.
2 Answer is considerably effective to 
probability and/or consequence of cyber 
accident.
3 Answer is highly effective to probability 
and/or consequence of cyber accident.
4 Answer is extremely effective to 
probability and/or consequence of cyber 
accident.
After designation of answer choices, they are converted into 
numerical values as shown in Table 2 in order to scale probability 
and/or consequence of potential cyber accident.
Further in-depth scaling of questionnaire with probability 
and consequence weights included is shown in Table 3.
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Table 3.
Questions valued for probability and/or consequence, with their respective answer choice.
Question 
Weight value of Probability (P); Consequence (C)
Answer choice / Numerical value of 
answer choice
Q1 Have you ever shared your personal passwords with a colleague? 
P=3 ; C=3
Yes / 4 
No / 0
Q2 Did you know that emails containing attachments are the most common way of 
cyber-attack? 
P=3 ; C=3
Yes / 0 
No / 4
Q3 Did you know that a displayed web address in an email could be different from the 
underlying link that it will direct to? 
P=2 ; C=3
Yes / 0 
No / 4
Q4 Did you know that "From" field in an email can be manipulated to show any 
trusted email address? 
P=2 ; C=2
Yes / 0 
No / 4
Q5 Did you know that NMEA 0183 protocol has no encryption? 
P=2 ; C=3
Yes / 0 
No / 4
Q6 Is it safe to open any email while anti-virus is running? 
P=2 ; C=3
Yes / 4 
No / 0
Q7 Do you know what DDoS attack is and how it can disrupt or slow down ship’s IT 
systems or network services? 
P=2 ; C=3
Yes / 4 
No / 0
Q8 In your opinion, are crew members an important factor in terms of cyber-security 
vulnerabilities of on-board systems? 
P=N/A ; C=2
Yes / 0 
No / 4
Q9 Have you ever heard about the social engineering attacks on seafarers and about 
their ways of manipulation of seafarers to break the vessel’s security procedures to 
gain access to critical systems or networks? 
P=2 ; C=3
Yes / 0 
No / 4
Q10 How do threat actors use a Short Messaging Service (SMS) to infect the mobile 
device of seafarers? 
P=1 ; C=2
By sending fake links / 0 
By sending suspicious attachments / 0 
I do not know / 4
Q11 Usually, how many different sites do you visit while browsing web when you are 
off duty? 
P=1 ; C=N/A
More than 10 / 4 
Between 6-9 / 3 
Between 3-5 / 2 
Less than 3 / 1
Q12 How much time do you spend connected on ship’s WI-FI network, daily? 
P=2 ; C=2
More than 6 hours / 4 
Between 3-5 hours / 3 
Between 1-3 hours / 2 
Less than 1 hour / 1
Q13 Are you using Administrator or Normal user account to log on into ship’s PC? 
P=2 ; C=3
Administrator / 4 
Normal user / 1
Q14 Do you regularly update PC? 
P=2 ; C=3
Yes / 0 
No / 4
Q15 Do you know the adverse effects of seafarers’ Bring-Your-Own-Device (BYOD) on 
board? 
P=2 ; C=2
Yes / 0 
No / 4
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Table 4.
Risk table representing probability of cyber incident upon survey results.
Table 5.
Risk table representing consequences of cyber incident upon survey results.
Q16 Patching, updating and maintaining of ship’s navigation system (e.g. ECDIS) is 
always crucial. Does your company have these security controls in its cyber-risk 
assessment plan? 
P=2 ; C=3
Yes / 0 
No / 4
Q17 Is it true that a cyber-incident can go unnoticed for a substantial period and does 
not have to involve an obvious system fault or alarming ransomware messages? 
P=2 ; C=3
Yes / 0 
No / 4
Q18 What is the typical sign that your vessel’s IT/OT infrastructure is cyber-attacked? 
P=2 ; C=3
System is slow or unresponsive / 0 
System displays warnings and alarms 
to inform the user about an on-going 
cyber-attack / 4 
I do not know / 4
The minimum and maximum probability of cyber incident 
can be scaled based on survey results by using the equation (2):
i
∑ wi pi  (2)
Calculations are presented in Table 4, where possible 
survey values are grouped evenly and scaled to represent the 
probability level of risk parameter.
Table 4 is the risk table constructed for the probability of 
cyber-security incident parameter. As per Table 4, maximum 
possible value for survey result is 136, while minimum value 
is 5. For the purpose of this research, the interval of ‘very high 
probability’ is set to 27, while for other scales it is set to 25.
Using the same principle and replacing i with j in equation 
(2), the authors obtained the minimum and maximum values 
of the survey output to measure the consequences of cyber 
incident (Table 5).
Survey result Qualitative scale Quantitative scale [T1]
5-30 Very low probability 1
31-56 Low probability 2
57-82 Medium probability 3
83-108 High probability 4
109-136 Very high probability 5
Survey result Qualitative scale Quantitative scale [T2]
2-37 Negligible consequences 1
38-73 Minor consequences 2
74-109 Important consequences 3
110-145 Serious consequences 4
146-184 Very serious consequences 5





Table 5 is the risk table constructed for the consequence of 
cyber-security incident parameter. As per Table 5, the maximum 
possible value for the survey result is 184, while the minimum 
value is 2. For the purpose of this research, the interval of ‘very 
high probability’ is set to 38, while for other scales it is set to 35.
Quantitative risk matrix used for this research is presented 
in Table 6. It is a modified version of the risk matrix which is 
frequently seen on board merchant vessels and is widely used 
for risk assessment of daily tasks (Maritime and Coastguard 
Agency, 2019). Multiplying quantitative values of probability and 
consequences, the final value of the risk is obtained.
Likelihood of harm 
(probability - P)
Severity of harm (consequences - C)
1 = Negligible 2 = Minor 3 = Important 4 = Serious 5 = Very serious
1 = Very low 1 = Very low risk 2 = Very low risk 3 = Very low risk 4 = Low risk 5 = Low risk
2 = Low 2 = Very low risk 4 = Low risk 6 = Low risk 8 = Medium risk 10 = Medium risk
3 = Medium 3 = Very low risk 6 = Low risk 9 = Medium risk 12 = Medium risk 15 = High risk
4 = High 4 = Low risk 8 = Medium risk 12 = Medium risk 16 = High risk 20 = Very high risk
5 = Very high 5 = Low risk 10 = Medium risk 15 = High risk 20 = Very high risk 25 = Very high risk
Once the previous steps were completed, questions were 
distributed to 638 people who are active seafarers. Out of that 
number, 429 people fully responded to the questionnaire. Due to 
space constraints, Table 7 represents an extract of all the collected 
data, with average calculated probability [T1] and consequences 
[T2] of risk.
Calculated risk based on the conducted-survey 
questionnaire, by application of fundamental risk equation (1) is 
11.18, which can be described as medium level risk.
Respondent # m  
[m=n]
Probability of cyber incident 
∑ i wi pi , where i = 429
T1 Consequences of cyber incident 
∑ j wj pj , where j = 429
T2
Respondent # 1 88 4 88 3
Respondent # 2 96 4 128 4
Respondent # 3 80 3 116 4
Respondent # 4 48 2 68 2
Respondent # 5 80 3 80 3
… … … … …
Respondent # m … … … …
… … … … …
Respondent # 429 72 3 76 3
( ( ∑ m [ T1 ( ∑ i wi pi )]) ) 3.26 ( ( ∑ m [ T2 ( ∑ j wj pj )]) ) 3.43m n= =
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Table 8.
Proposed model course for cyber-security awareness.
6. SOLUTIONS
Maritime industry is being rapidly digitalised, and IT is 
playing a crucial role in this regard. Before knowing how to 
prevent cyber-attacks, it is essential to know how these attacks 
are detected. Typically, seafarers are unaware of the attack and 
remain oblivious until a real loss occurs. It is indispensable for 
seafarers not only to adopt and understand new technologies, 
but also to keep themselves abreast of threats and attacks in the 
face of the ship’s IT infrastructure.
Based on the conducted quantitative survey and ISRAM 
risk assessment methodology, authors measured the risk level 
of cyber-security awareness of Montenegrin seafarers. Rated 
as a medium-level risk, it can be treated as a clear indicator of 
necessity of urgent actions. 
The human factor is always crucial when it comes to the 
cyber security of a ship, and this is also an important subject 
of this research paper. To that end, the authors proposed a 
model of the training course that should be set as mandatory 
for all crewmembers. The model course is presented in Table 8. 
The proposed training course should be set mandatory for all 
crewmembers, and it should continue in form of refresh courses 
on a regular 5-year basis. Implementation into the existing IMO 
model course 3.27 – Security awareness training for all seafarers, 
is also possible.
As per Table 8, the course should consist of 8 topics and 
should last for 8 hours, out of which 2.5 hrs are dedicated to 
demonstration purposes.
Topic Duration in hrs
Theory Demonstration
1. Introduction to cyber security 0.5
2. SMS vs. cyber security – IMO requirements and legal framework 0.5
3. Identification of threats – Types of cyber-attack (DDoS, Phishing, etc.) 1.0 1.0
4. Identification of vulnerable shipboard systems (IBS, engine/cargo/ballast control systems and 
NMEA 0183 standard)
1.0
5. Cyber-security risk assessment 0.5 0.5
6. Measures for prevention and detection of cyber-attack – technological and behavioural 1.0 1.0
7. Reporting cyber attacks 0.5
8. Conclusion 0.5
          TOTAL 8,0 hrs
Proposed training would educate Montenegrin Seafarers 
about ship’s IT security policies, procedures, and best practices 
that are required to better work in a ship’s IT environment.
Security familiarisation training is also essential before 
joining the ship's duties. The Shipboard familiarisation checklist 
should be expanded to include cyber-security related training, 
which should be performed by the Ship Security Officer or an 
equally qualified seafarer. Familiarisation process should be 
adequately structured to guide a newly joining seafarer how 
to report a security incident, how to act in IT security-related 
emergencies and to explain which security solution is required in 
the event of a cyber-security incident.
7. CONCLUSION
In the world of digital warfare, the global shipping 
community including vessels, ports, terminals and various 
other facilities are relying heavily on the Internet to establish 
connectivity. Automated equipment, GNSS, ECDIS, AIS, engine/
ballast/cargo control systems, and consignment tracking systems 
are just some of the items dependent on adequate cyber security. 
Policies and procedures on board ships should be structured 
and planned, accompanied by an appropriate IT infrastructure 
including firewalls, anti-malwares, etc. Ship’s IT infrastructure is 
vulnerable to cyber-attacks, and human error can play its part in 
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this regard. Therefore, achieving the overall cyber security of the 
ship is out of the question without a proper and effective training 
of seafarers. The conducted risk assessment based on survey 
questionnaire implicitly shows that human resources are a hot 
topic in terms of cyber security on board ships. 
Montenegrin seafarers are mostly novices with regard to IT 
and cyber security. In addition, they have not acquired any IT and 
cyber-security related education from shore-based institutions 
either. For example, neither Maritime High Schools nor Maritime 
Faculties in Montenegro are providing any sort of education 
about cyber security at sea. Thus, maritime cyber security of 
Montenegrin seafarers is not up to the mark and needs urgent 
attention.
Therefore, a holistic approach to cyber security should 
start with the increase of people’s awareness and focusing of 
knowledge on the mindset with appropriate training. If their 
training is planned to make them aware and ready to act on any 
threat, there is no doubt that the overall risk will be significantly 
reduced.
Implementation of the authors’ proposed training course 
would set a milestone on security at sea. The proposed model 
course in cyber-security awareness would help in protecting 
confidentiality, integrity, and accessibility of information through 
various measures relating to people, processes, and IT systems 
on board ships. 
Further research should focus on developing unique 
teaching syllabus of cyber security that will suit the needs of both 
Montenegrin seafarers and their employers. 
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